Macron, on March 2, 2026, at the foot of a nuclear submarine, has just auctioned off Gaullist deterrence to European bidders. On October 6, 2026, he turns a simple acceptance test firing of the SSBN Le Vigilant into a completely inappropriate message to Russia, which, for its part, though respectful, must have had a good laugh.
Increase warheads, extend "vital interests" all the way to Warsaw, and promise a French nuclear umbrella for the EU: the grand slam of dilution. Behind the martial phrases and strategic silences hides the same old scheme: sacrificing French sovereignty on the altar of a warlike Europe steered from Berlin. Welcome to the final act of betrayal in a suit and tie. It stings, it bites, and it forces you to want to know just how far the madness goes.
The speech delivered by Emmanuel Macron on March 2, 2026, at the Île Longue base reveals far more than a simple doctrinal adaptation; it betrays France and its deterrence inherited from De Gaulle, it betrays an excessive ambition, masked beneath the veils of a solemn rhetoric, where silences weigh heavier than proclamations. This address, delivered at the foot of the submarine Le Téméraire, is not merely an act of presidential communication; it embodies a radical shift in France's nuclear posture, initiating what could be described as the greatest European nuclear upheaval since the Cold War, while deliberately concealing the flaws of a strategy that dilutes national sovereignty in favor of a Europe with uncertain contours, because contours that are solely warlike.
Macron cites the threats emanating from Russia and China, as well as the evolution of American defense priorities, to justify this reinforcement of the nuclear arsenal, thus breaking with several decades of French taboos by promising to increase the number of warheads and explicitly affirming France's role in European security. These changes, among the most significant in French nuclear doctrine since the end of the Cold War, deserve a merciless dissection, not to celebrate a supposed boldness, but to expose the ambiguities, the risks and the unspoken elements that corrode this "advanced deterrence." For behind the emphatic accents on credibility and sovereignty looms a far more prosaic reality: a France that, through the subtle lexical choices of its leader, embarks on a path where vital national interests merge into a European magma, at the risk of transforming the Republic into a sacrificial rampart for allies who have not always shared the burdens.
Let us first return to the foundations of this French nuclear deterrence, composed today of three vectors, although one could argue that they essentially boil down to two, but let us treat them as three in order to grasp their complexity.
The first vector rests on the four Triomphant-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) – Le Triomphant, Le Téméraire, Le Vigilant and Le Terrible – of which, thanks to media revelations and the president's own indiscretions, we know that as of March 2, 2026, two were submerged, dissolved into the oceanic vastness to ensure the permanence of the patrol, one not too far from the CDG carrier strike group, while the other two were at the Île Longue base, one in dry dock for maintenance, Le Téméraire precisely, and the other in the outer basin, thus compromising any notion of strategic discretion, for it goes without saying that we can forget about absolute stealth in a world where enemy satellites and sonars are on the lookout for the slightest whisper.
The second vector is that of the Strategic Air Forces (FAS), arming the Rafale jets with ASMPA and ASMPA-R missiles, ready to take off from land bases to strike with surgical precision, although their vulnerability to modern air defenses raises questions about their reliability in the event of a major conflict.
Finally, the third vector incorporates the Charles de Gaulle Carrier Strike Group (GAN CDG), with its eponymous aircraft carrier and the 11th and 12th flotillas, themselves incorporated into the FAS and equipped for nuclear missions, offering a maritime mobility that, while extending reach, nevertheless exposes them to increased risks on the high seas.
France currently holds approximately 290 nuclear warheads, of all types combined, distributed among its SSBNs, the FAS and the CDG, an arsenal that, although modest compared to the thousands of American or Russian warheads, is theoretically sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage on any aggressor, according to the doctrine of strict sufficiency established since De Gaulle. Yet France has abandoned any land-based nuclear component, as was once the case with the Pluton and Hadès missiles and the Albion Plateau installations, dismantled in the 1990s, leaving a void that Macron seems to skirt around without daring to name it explicitly.
With these basic facts established, let us dive into the acid analysis of the speech itself, avoiding any superfluous return to history in order to focus on Macron's insane plans, where what he announces is eclipsed by what he conceals, diluting inconvenient truths in a choice of words calculated to muddy the waters.
He first proclaims an increase in the number of nuclear warheads, but stubbornly refuses to specify to what level this increase will be taken, a silence that speaks volumes about the real limits of this ambition. To gauge its scope, a look back is necessary: France stopped producing fissile material for military purposes in 1996, and assuming that, since the dismantling of the Pluton and Hades missiles, it has stored this material or the associated warheads without neutralizing them, while no longer being able to rapidly restart new production, the maximum number of accessible warheads stands at around 500, corresponding precisely to the 504 warheads France possessed at the time.
French stocks of fissile materials are estimated at 102 tonnes of separated plutonium and about 29 tonnes of unirradiated highly enriched uranium (HEU), most of the plutonium (96.25 tonnes) coming from spent fuel from nuclear reactors, and the HEU stock includes 3.8 tonnes of unirradiated civilian HEU. Large-scale production of plutonium for military purposes ceased in 1992, and France announced the definitive halt of fissile material production for weapons on 22 February 1996, ending that of highly enriched uranium at the end of June 1996. Regarding highly enriched uranium, France produced it at a dedicated complex near Pierrelatte, on the Tricastin site, shut down and being dismantled since 1996, with a current stock of military-grade HEU estimated at 25 ± 6 tonnes, plus 5,369 kg of civilian HEU declared in December 2023, of which 3,801 kg are unirradiated, some of foreign origin intended for research reactors, while the Georges Besse II commercial plant enriches uranium for civilian purposes.
For military plutonium, production began in 1956 and stopped in 1992, via the G1, G2 and G3 reactors at Marcoule, the Phénix reactor producing about 340 kg for weapons, and the Célestin reactors generating 700 to 800 kg of military-grade plutonium in addition to tritium, not to mention the use of civilian reactors for military purposes.
The total quantity of military-grade plutonium produced is estimated at 7 ± 1 tonnes, of which one tonne was consumed in tests, leaving a current stock of about 6 ± 1 tonnes for weapons. As for civilian plutonium, the UP2 and UP3 plants at La Hague separate 96.25 tonnes of unirradiated civilian plutonium as of 31 December 2023, plus 14.45 tonnes of foreign plutonium, mainly Japanese.
Thus, the increase in warheads is not linked to a resumption of fissile production, halted for too long to be promptly restarted, but to the capacity of the CEA facility at Valduc to assemble new warheads, such as the TNO and TNA, replacing the TN-90 and TN-75 currently being dismantled, limiting the arsenal to a maximum of 500 in its classic composition.
But here is the crucial “but”: Macron avoids any mention of tactical nuclear warheads, those small, moderate-yield warheads, compared to those that wipe out a city in an instant, and as is his habit, the unspoken words or coded phrases, such as “advanced deterrence”, reveal the most embarrassing part. Let us recall, just in case, that the Hadès missiles equipped with the TN-90 were intended solely to strike from French territory the Warsaw Pact forces on German soil before they reached our borders, or the associated command bunkers, while the TN-75 equipped the M45, replaced by the TNO for the M51 and their variants.
Technical and Operational Implications
Based on expert analyses, France has stocks of fissile materials (enriched uranium and plutonium) to produce hundreds of additional warheads without immediately restarting production: about 25 tonnes of highly enriched uranium and 6 tonnes of military plutonium.
Theoretically, this allows adding 300 to 500 strategic warheads, or more if tactical ones are included (smaller, for the battlefield). But with losses (15%) and reserves (20%), we arrive at about 680 additional warheads for an all-strategic scenario, limited by the platforms (max 384 on current SSBNs). Let us add that an M51 missile in its latest version can travel more than 13,000 km, yes, that is true but not at full nuclear warhead load.
For a mix, after maximizing the strategic ones, up to 1,466 tactical warheads could be added. However, the doctrine remains strategic; no immediate return to land-based tactical weapons like the old Pluton missiles, which required 5-10 years of development, and HADES. However, again, since Macron did not mention it, anything is possible, and the technology is already acquired, it would only require a major update.
The Time Required: How Many Years to Increase the Arsenal?
Nothing happens overnight. Macron speaks of a "progressive" implementation. Here are the stages:
Assembling the Warheads: The CEA center at Valduc (Burgundy) handles this. Capacity: 50 warheads per year max without expansion. For 200 additional warheads, it takes 3-5 years. With existing stocks, there is no need to restart enrichment (plants closed since 1996), which would take 10-15 years.
Modernizing the Delivery Systems: New M51.3 missile already in service, hypersonic missiles in 2035. New SSBN "L'Invincible" in 2036 – 10 years of construction, at best… this does not take into account the multiple delays and budget overruns that will have to be voted through.
Advanced Deterrence: European participation in exercises from 2026-2027, but deployments under certain circumstances could take years of negotiations. Some Nordic or Baltic countries have enshrined in their constitutions the prohibition of WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) on their territories
Overall Timeline: For a moderate increase (say +100-200 warheads), 3-5 years. For something more ambitious, 10+ years if new delivery systems or fissile production are needed. The update of the Military Programming Law (LPM) in spring 2027 will set the schedule.
In summary: The increase could begin quickly with existing stocks, but the full impact (more warheads + European doctrine) will unfold over a decade.
The Cost: How Much Will It Cost Taxpayers?
Money is the sinews of war. Nuclear deterrence is already expensive: about 5.6 billion euros per year to maintain the current arsenal, or 13% of the defense budget (€57.1 billion in 2026).
Announced Funding: The increase will be covered by a budgetary "surge" in the update of the 2024-2030 LPM. The current LPM provides €413 billion for defense through 2030, plus an additional €36 billion. Nuclear takes a growing share.
Estimates for the Increase: No precise figure from Macron, but experts estimate:
Producing a warhead costs ~10-20 million euros (materials, assembly, testing).
For +200 warheads: €2-4 billion, plus delivery system costs (additional missiles ~€100 billion/unit).
New SSBN: ~€8-10 billion (similar to previous ones).
Total over 7 years: +€10-20 billion for nuclear, out of the €36 billion added.
Impact on the National Budget: Defense accounts for ~2% of French GDP. This increase could require trade-offs (less for education or health?). But Macron argues it is an "exceptional effort" for sovereignty. Sovereignty? We will come back to that…
In perspective: It is expensive, but compared to the State's €1,000 billion annual budget, it is, according to Macron, "manageable". Naturally, Nicolas is the one paying, and no one asks him if he agrees. And for his supporters, it is the price of independence.
Conclusion: billions more, financed by the LPM, therefore by Nicolas, except that Macron asks no one for anything, neither the French people nor parliament. Macron is taking the world for a ride!
This speech, delivered at the foot of the submarine Le Téméraire, is not merely a rhetorical exercise; it embodies a profound metamorphosis of France's strategic posture, which the president calls a "major evolution." Yet, beyond the solemn tones and invocations of sovereignty, a decision looms that raises serious questions about the true motivations and the risks inherent in this "advanced deterrence." For, by invoking a world in rupture, marked by geopolitical upheavals, war in Ukraine, modernization of Russian and Chinese arsenals, transatlantic uncertainties, Macron is not merely strengthening the national arsenal; he is subtly diluting France's vital interests into a broader European whole, at the risk of turning France into the shield of a Union that has not always known how to define its own borders.
This announcement, which came on the eve of March 3, 2026, deserves careful dissection, not to celebrate a presumed boldness, but to reveal its flaws, ambiguities and the perils it harbors, particularly in the context of tensions with Russia and French involvement in Ukraine. The setting of the speech is eloquent in itself, because I am the first to acknowledge it is a majestic site, and for those who are keen on history, its history is rich: Île Longue, bastion of the four nuclear ballistic missile submarines of the "Triomphant" class, Le Triomphant, Le Téméraire, Le Vigilant and Le Terrible, thus symbolizes the permanence of French deterrence, with at least one submersible on uninterrupted patrol, armed with M51 missiles with intercontinental ranges. It is there that Macron justifies his shift by a "international context of rupture full of risks", listing the threats: Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Moscow's and Beijing's nuclear advances, frictions in the Middle East involving Iran, and doubts about American reliability, amplified by electoral deadlines across the Atlantic. "This period justifies a hardening of our nuclear deterrence", he proclaims, announcing a "progressive" implementation to adapt France to a European universe.
But this rhetoric masks a more prosaic reality: by broadening the scope of deterrence, Macron seems less concerned with the strict defense of the homeland than with a European ambition that could well drag the nation into unsolicited torments. At the heart of this "advanced deterrence" lies a triptych that, under appearances of reinforcement, betrays a potential dilution of sovereignty.
First, the upgrading of the national arsenal: Macron orders an increase in nuclear warheads, keeping the figure secret for reasons of "strategic secrecy", we discussed this above. Starting from a current arsenal of about 290 warheads, this expansion would draw on existing reserves, 25 tons of highly enriched uranium and some 6 tons of military plutonium, without immediately restarting fissile production. Added to this is accelerated modernization: deployment of the M51.3 missile, stealthier and with greater range, development of hypersonic vehicles by 2030, and construction of a new SSBN christened "L'Invincible", operational in 2036.
These measures aim to counter adversary missile defenses, but they raise a nagging question: why this increase, if not to project a power that far exceeds the needs of France alone?
Then, the European extension: France's "vital interests", territory, population, independence suddenly acquire a "European dimension", as Macron asserts: "We must think our deterrence strategy in the depth of the European continent, in full respect of our sovereignty".
Macron pulled the same circus on us with Mercosur, and while he was holding exactly the same discourse with Mercosur, we were already saying it was a done deal and that France was going to be plucked like a 6-week-old turkey. That is exactly what happened, Macron knew it and he lied shamelessly.
Eight allied countries, 10 in fact as of October 7, 2026, with Germany as the figurehead, but also potentially Poland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and even Ukraine and post-Brexit United Kingdom, are invited to join. This translates into participation in nuclear exercises, simulations, planning, training flights with inert missiles, and the possible hosting of French strategic air forces, such as Rafales armed with ASMP-A/R, on their soil and not only in times of crisis but permanently, that is what must be read between the lines.
Or even, in a hypothetical perspective, a return to land-based components, although France has abandoned its tactical weapons since the 1990s. And of that, Macron says nothing. Yet everyone knows that the FAS are ultra vulnerable, it is a suicide mission that one is not even certain can be carried out successfully.
Since France remains the only power in the European Union equipped with SSBNs, this “advanced deterrence” would rely essentially on the air and land components to extend its protective shadow. Yet Macron hammers home that there will be “no sharing of the ultimate decision, nor of its planning, nor of its implementation”: France retains the monopoly on the nuclear trigger, making this cooperation unilateral, almost paternalistic.
How cute, and he imagines that with his ambitions, we will take him at his word, even though since 2017 he has done nothing but betray France and the only bastion he had not yet touched was precisely French nuclear deterrence.
Finally, this “advanced” posture implies increased geographical and operational projection: permanent and temporary deployments or exercises in “continental depth”, potentially in Eastern Europe, in the face of perceived threats.
Distinct from NATO, where France does not participate in the nuclear planning group dominated by the United States, this initiative is meant to be a complement, strengthening European autonomy without competing with it. No, it is indeed a means of replacement that must be seen and understood.
Macron presents it as a “bet on the future” for a sovereign Europe, with exercises to be launched as early as 2026-2027. But this evolution differs radically from the previous doctrine of “strict sufficiency”, purely national and defensive, vaguely mentioned since 2020 without being implemented, and put in place since General de Gaulle. Henceforth, it appears more offensive, inclusive and robust, still in response to a vital threat, but broadened.
As the president stresses, in English for international impact: “To be free, you must be feared. And to be feared, you must be powerful”. Macron is stark raving mad. The implications of this decision are vast and worrying, because for anyone who can read between the lines of what Macron says, it is indeed about transforming the French-French nuclear umbrella into a European beach parasol, and we all know that with the federalisation of the United States of Europe, the European army, and European deterrence, we are witnessing the end of Nation States and therefore the transfer of what de Gaulle’s France created to a European Federation in the hands of the Germans, as Walter Hallstein wanted. This makes Merz’s eagerness and Von der Leyen’s remarks all the more understandable, when she tells Marius Rochebin that Macron has a crucial role to play.
Indeed he does, and his final role is to hand over the heart of French defence to the EU and the Krauts!
What Macron is engaging in is high treason. Nothing less!
For those who have already seen the trailer for the film Jupiter, due out in November, there is every reason to be worried, since in this film, the President of the Republic places neo-Nazi, Banderite Ukraine under France’s nuclear protection. We all know that this film is a commissioned work, and I have already discussed at length in the media the dramatic messages found in this film.
On the security front, Macron claims it increases French credibility against “combined” threats—Russia, China, Iran, North Korea—and offers the EU a partial alternative to the American umbrella, particularly if Washington refocuses on Asia. Leaders such as Merz welcome this “security relationship distinct from NATO”, seeing a strengthening of French leadership.
Yet the costs look exorbitant: billions more for expansion and modernisation, integrated into the spring update of the 2026 Military Programming Law.
The timelines: three to five years for the first warheads via the CEA centre at Valduc, a decade for the new SSBN, and the same for the new hypersonic missile intended to replace the ASMPA.
This is where an in-depth critique becomes necessary, revealing the flaws of this doctrine. Although Macron portrays it as an inevitable response to a hostile world, many observers detect recklessness, a drift contrary to national interests.
Extending deterrence to the vital interests of the EU and partner countries dilutes French sovereignty: instead of being confined to the defence of national soil, deterrence becomes an instrument serving a European collective, in which a crisis in Poland or the Baltic states could involve Paris, even without a direct threat to mainland France. This shift erodes the Gaullist doctrine of independence, turning France into a nuclear policeman for a Union with blurred contours, a warrior union that will hide behind the French beach umbrella.
Moreover, by planning forward deployments, the hosting of Rafales or, hypothetically, of land-based components among allies, Macron exposes the nation to reprisals, with no tangible benefit for its citizens. Why risk the homeland for peripheral interests? This turns Europe into an archipelago of shared vulnerabilities, where France, the sole holder of SSBNs and of a nuclear deterrent sufficient to date, assumes the risks without sharing the power. It is clear and obvious that if this is implemented, France will lose control of the launch button. It is equally obvious that this unilateral decision by Macron violates all treaties in force.
Worse still, this doctrine postulates the existence of enemies for France or the EU, implicitly targeting Russia even though it is not an intrinsic adversary.
In his address, Macron mentions “Russian threats,” nuclear modernisation, the Ukrainian conflict, but it is Paris that positions itself as the antagonist. Historically, Franco-Russian relations, woven from alliances and cultural dialogue, were not hostile; it is Western and French engagement in Ukraine, supported by Macron, who now has only war to show the rest of the world that he exists, through weapons and declarations, that has exacerbated the frictions. By linking forward deterrence to Eastern Europe, the president implies that France could counter Russian actions against NATO or EU allies.
But if France focused on its internal affairs, a faltering economy, abyssal debt, social fractures, insecurity, rather than clumsily intervening in Ukraine, it would avoid drawing Moscow's wrath. Macron even mentioned Ukraine as a potential “shoulder force” in European contexts, and this speech is steeped in that: he therefore suggests that the EU and France are considering operations on Ukrainian territory, increased aid, even a presence, technology transfers, not to mention the fact that the SVR has obtained evidence of France's assistance to Ukraine in the nuclear field, risking escalation.
Why this interventionism, contrary to French interests, if not to contain Russia at the cost of a wider conflict, with its energy and economic corollaries? This “forward” posture appears provocative: deploying French nuclear forces near Russian borders, via partners such as Poland and the Nordic and Baltic countries, to name only Poland, evokes encirclement, fuelling Russia's grievances against NATO expansion, European version.
Since Russia knows that Europe is the slave of the Americans, I leave you to imagine the picture. Russia did not accept it from the Americans, do you believe it will accept it from Europe? No, obviously!
The result? Russia could harden its own doctrine, generating a vicious circle. Critical voices, such as those in the committed press, denounce a “nuclear spiral” in which Macron drags France into unnecessary quarrels, serving Atlanticist rather than national agendas.
By broadening deterrence, he risks involving the nation in peripheral conflicts, against its deep interests. If the EU operates in Ukraine, that inevitably attracts Russian retaliation, cyber, conventional or worse. This “clumsy” diplomacy prioritises escalation over mediation, completely betraying the Gaullist legacy. It assumes a Manichaean vision: enemies against allies, with Russia as scapegoat, whereas prioritising “internal affairs” would make France more resilient without these costly commitments.
In short, Macron's forward deterrence aims to make us believe that he will raise France to the rank of European nuclear big brother, without letting go of the reins. All Macron has done since 2017 is drag France into the depths of the EU.
Good grief, this guy isn't capable of ridding us of a mafia group like the DZ Mafia and he wants to take on nuclear war?
It is therefore an implementation that should be gradual: exercises from 2026-2027, deployments as needed, expansion of the arsenal over three to five years. "To be free, one must be feared," he asserts. But this strategic gamble, in a complex world, appears more than questionable: by extending France's vital interests to the EU, by planning forward deployments, and by targeting Russia via Ukraine, Macron could well turn France into a perceived aggressor, rather than a neutral defender. Does this strengthen peace, or does it attract unnecessary wrath? The debate is open, and history, merciless, will judge.
What I see above all is that Macron has perpetuated the betrayal of the French left since he came to power, even before, and that since 2017, we have been witnessing the methodical destruction of France. There was only one sector that Macron had not attacked, and that was French nuclear deterrence. On March 2, 2026, I watched, stunned, that speech in that mythical place, because the public cannot access it, let alone cameras, stunned by the words chosen to hand us a nice praline deep down, and above all I witnessed the silence of the military personnel present. The French army in its entirety is not in the service of Macron; it is there to defend our territory, our citizens, our vital national interests, and not to serve as a beach parasol for a bunch of crazed lunatics who are plunging us toward the abyss.
At some point these men and women will have to make a choice; senior officers, officers and non-commissioned officers, as well as enlisted personnel, normally know military law. Macron is irremediably betraying France and the French, and letting him touch nuclear matters is inconceivable because the very survival of the French Nation is directly at stake. France has absolutely no need to increase its nuclear capacity, in number of warheads, because what it already possesses is largely sufficient to ensure its own protection, whether against Russia or China, and that is the very principle of so-called "asymmetric" nuclear deterrence. On the other hand, it must obviously replace its old equipment with new, more modern and more efficient equipment, that yes.
Why does it not need more? Because France must immediately leave NATO, the EU, the Eurozone, Schengen, and urgently pass a law stipulating that any national law takes precedence over any law stemming from a sick alliance like that of the EU. Because France must become once again a sovereign, independent Nation-State, master of its borders and its currency, and focused on itself and not on its current masters.
By leaving all this circus, by at the same time ceasing to support a state like Ukraine and focusing solely on its vital national interests, you will find that France has no enemies and that this race for more nuclear warheads and European nuclear deterrence becomes ipso facto useless, and all at once we will fall back to "DEFCON 4." But for that, it is imperative to neutralize the main danger for France: its president, Macron, and his political class which since 2024 and before has done nothing but prove to us that it is useless and self-centered, except perhaps a few, but they are becoming rare. It is at this price, and only at this price, that France will not disappear.
But the Macron joke does not stop there…
On September 17, 2026, the Official Journal made public an order establishing a temporary prohibited zone off Pluguffan, near Brest. This provision announced, with almost prophetic clarity, that a test firing of a strategic sea-to-land ballistic missile of the M51 family would be carried out between September 21 and October 28.
That is precisely what happened the following October 6. In a solemn press release, the Ministry of the Armed Forces announced the success of the acceptance firing of an M51.3 missile carried out by the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, Le Vigilant, as part of Operation SMERTRIOS, a name borrowed from a god of war worshipped by the Gallo-Roman populations. Note, incidentally, that death, in Russian, is said and written "смерть," which in Latin letters gives "smert." How can one not see in this a hidden message from Macron to Russia.
This projectile, naturally stripped of its nuclear payload in accordance with France's international commitments, was tracked with extreme care by the assets of the Directorate General of Armaments, Missile Testing, including the Monge Test and Measurement Ship. By Russia too...
The impact zone was located in the North Atlantic, several hundred kilometres from any coast. This firing validates the operational capability of the weapon system of the SSBN Le Vigilant, and is supposed to demonstrate the excellence of French high technology in the field of deterrence. Operation SMERTRIOS had the precise aim of confirming this vessel's ability to deploy the M51.3, officially already accepted into service on 28 October 2025.
The submarine Le Vigilant (hull number S618) is the third unit of the Le Triomphant class, which comprises four vessels forming the backbone of the Oceanic Strategic Force. Laid down in January 1996, launched on 19 September 2003 and commissioned on 26 November 2004, it measures 138 metres in length with a beam of 12.5 metres and a draught of 10.6 metres. Its displacement reaches 12,640 tonnes on the surface and 14,335 tonnes submerged. Powered by a 150-megawatt K15 pressurised water reactor, coupled with a turbo-reduction gear unit and a pump-jet delivering 41,500 horsepower, it reaches a speed of 25 knots submerged and can dive beyond 400 metres.
Its crew numbers around 111 men, including 15 officers, organised into two crews to ensure continuous presence at sea. In addition to its sixteen vertical tubes intended for M51 missiles, it has four 533-millimetre torpedo tubes capable of deploying a mix of heavy torpedoes and Exocet SM39 anti-ship missiles. Le Vigilant has just completed a long period of Scheduled Maintenance and Repair Unavailability, begun in autumn 2023 under the project management of Naval Group. This IPER made it possible to carry out preventive and corrective maintenance work on all systems: power generation and propulsion, dive safety, steering and operation systems, onboard living comfort, hull and structures. This acceptance firing therefore marks its full return to the operational deterrence cycle.
As for the M51.3 missile itself, it represents the third operational version of this family of submarine-launched ballistic strategic missiles developed by ArianeGroup under the project ownership of the Directorate General of Armaments. Twelve metres long and weighing more than fifty tonnes at launch (between 52 and 54 tonnes depending on the source), this three-stage solid-propellant launcher can reach hypersonic speeds of around Mach 25 during the propulsion phase and Mach 20 during atmospheric re-entry.
That is on paper, because to date, only Russia masters low-altitude hypersonic technology, including with MIRV warheads, which is not the case, not yet, with the M51.3. Indeed, while it is effectively hypersonic in space, like all ballistic missiles, it will lose its hypersonic capability on re-entering the atmosphere. Not Russian missiles...
Its apogee exceeds one thousand, or even, depending on the distance to be travelled, two thousand kilometres. Its exact range remains classified, but the most serious estimates place it between 8,000 and 13,000 kilometres, i.e. several hundred kilometres more than previous versions, giving it a genuine intercontinental capability. Here too, one must read between the lines: the maximum range cannot be achieved with a fully loaded M51.3...
It is capable of carrying 4 to 6 warheads in so-called "conventional" mode, or even up to 10 TNO-2 oceanic nuclear warheads with independent trajectories (MIRV), in "full load" mode but with a much reduced range, each with an estimated yield of around 100 kilotonnes, i.e. six to ten times the power of the Hiroshima bomb.
These warheads, designed and guaranteed by the Simulation program of the Directorate of Military Applications of the French Atomic Energy Commission, feature sophisticated penetration aids designed to defeat the most advanced anti-missile defenses. Accuracy, estimated at around 150 to 200 meters circular error probable, is thereby significantly improved. With each Le Triomphant-class SSBN capable of carrying sixteen of these devices, the combined firepower of a single vessel represents a strike force of considerable magnitude, capable of reaching almost any point on the globe from the depths of the ocean.
Geopolitically, this successful test has a significance that goes far beyond mere technical validation, but not in the good sense of the term, far from it.
In an international context marked by hardening threats, the multiplication of hybrid actions attributed to Russia, the uncertainties weighing on American commitment in Europe and the persistence of the nuclear ambitions of various actors, France, Macron, sought to assert with fanfare, the credibility and durability of its sovereign deterrence to Russia. Yes, let's not beat around the bush, Macron in his madness has simply sent a message to Vladimir Putin, and one need only look at the trajectory of this missile and then take its inverse symmetry to grasp its full significance. It is quite pathetic, moreover, because Russia has always respected French nuclear deterrence, and because it will take much more than this test to impress Russia.
Macron, as Jupiter, present aboard the multi-mission frigate Auvergne, himself emphasized that very few nations possess such expertise. He recalled the maxim that "to be free, one must be feared; and to be feared, one must be powerful", while mentioning the doubling of the military budget in ten years, the construction of future third-generation strategic submarines and the launch of the maneuvering hypersonic missile program intended for the air component.
But there is a catch, a grain of sand in Macron's fine speech: France is not free, it is not feared, nor is it powerful. France has become the laughingstock of the world, an economic abyss, and its nuclear deterrence, strictly French, is only defensive in purpose, not offensive.
There is also a second message:
This success also bolsters French ambitions regarding "advanced deterrence", a concept aimed at extending the national nuclear umbrella to certain European partners. It demonstrates that, faced with the evolution of adversary anti-missile defenses, France continues to adapt its deterrent tool with unwavering determination. The next version, the M51.4, already under development at ArianeGroup, promises further improvements in range, accuracy and penetration by 2035, thus extending this modernization trajectory.
Thus, through this test, admittedly carried out successfully, France did not content itself with validating a weapon system; it clumsily sought to reaffirm, in the eyes of the world, the soundness of its strategic autonomy and the intact vigor of its will to remain a free and feared power. Finally, on paper... because in reality, once again, to be free, feared and therefore powerful, one must not be governed by incompetents and traitors.