Behind the panelling of Alden Biesen Castle, on 12 February 2026 the EU has just set in motion the machine that will change everything without anyone noticing: rewriting the treaties without revising them, to the point of stealing from France the nuclear fire it believed eternal.
Macron's speech at Île Longue, the hidden message of the M51.3 missile acceptance test from the SSBN Le Vigilant, the German president's visit to the facilities where the M51 boosters and the Laser Mega Joule are manufactured, are not declarations of power. They are the starting signal.
In five or six years, the button will no longer be at the Élysée. It will be in Brussels, in the hands of a German federal President.
What you are about to discover is already under way. And when France understands, it will be too late to turn back.
Where History sometimes seems to repeat itself beneath the panelling of old castles, European leaders gather, talk about competitiveness, the single market, and leave in the shadows mechanisms that, silently, transform the very architecture of the Union. The informal meeting of 12 February 2026 at Alden Biesen Castle gave rise to a joint declaration whose stated objective remains the completion of the internal market; yet behind this facade of administrative modernity lies a program of institutional and procedural reforms of unprecedented scope. The aim is to change, without appearing to do so, the way European law is born, constructed, delegated, scrutinised and repealed, as well as the bodies responsible for overseeing these delicate operations.
Under the convenient cloak of simplification, this text advocates greater use of legislative packages, a systematic preference for regulations over directives, a drastic restriction of delegated and implementing acts, the widespread use of sunset clauses, and a determined offensive against so-called national over-regulation, crowned by a complete overhaul of the acquis communautaire through an annual simplification report submitted to the European Council. The President of the Commission has even committed to appearing before that same Council every year to account for progress on simplification and the reduction of administrative costs.
Make no mistake: this is not merely an economic strategy. It is a deliberate attempt to reshape, through an informal summit, the constitutional and institutional backbone of the entire Union, without ever resorting to the solemn guarantees of a formal revision of the treaties. The declaration provides, under the guise of political guidelines, genuine instructions on the choice of legislative instruments, on the structure of delegations of power and on the duration of validity of norms. Yet these matters fall, according to the founding texts, under the exclusive initiative of the Commission and the ordinary legislative procedure; the European Court of Justice has elevated them to intangible pillars of the institutional balance.
The most alarming symptom, the one that deserves lengthy attention, lies in the Commission's recent communication on "better regulation". This simply institutionalises the procedural shortcuts inaugurated by the first ten omnibus packages, in particular the exemption from the obligation of public consultation and impact assessment, which is nonetheless set in stone in the treaties. Thus the Commission, anticipating the criticisms of the European Ombudsman, proposes to replace the rules it has breached with new rules that henceforth authorise the same practices.
To gauge the gravity of the issue, one must return to what the constitutional law of the Union actually requires and to what the Alden Biesen commitments systematically pass over in silence. The institutional architecture rests on a principle that the Court of Justice elevated to the status of dogma from its earliest rulings: institutional balance. Unlike the principle of conferral, which delimits the Union's competences vis-à-vis the States, institutional balance is an interinstitutional principle. It requires that each body retain exactly the functions entrusted to it by the treaties; no institution may arrogate to itself those of another, even with the latter's consent, as forcefully recalled in the Wybot judgment. This balance is not a courtesy revocable at will; it constitutes a constitutional guarantee that protects the integrity of the legislative process itself, that is to say the community method with its qualified majority in the Council, and thereby the dignity of the citizens subject to that law.
Because yes, qualified majority voting can, in certain cases, be a guarantor of democracy and protection, except that given the composition of the voters today, it is no longer a rampart, as it was to avoid a war, but a veritable backdoor allowing the bypassing of those who, precisely, like Hungary, Slovakia and Czechia, refuse to plunge their own country, through the EU, into abysses destructive to their own national interests.
The European Council may well set out general political orientations; it cannot dictate the form, duration or procedure of legislative acts. This prohibition, enshrined in Article 15(1) of the TEU, forms an insurmountable rampart between intergovernmental diplomacy and the drafting of the law applicable to 450 million souls. It guarantees that the norms governing daily life are born of deliberation, under democratic control and judicial scrutiny.
Yet each of the reforms sketched out at Alden Biesen breaches this rampart. Choosing between a directive and a regulation, limiting delegated acts, imposing sunset clauses by simple political instruction, means substituting a single political preference for the case-by-case reasoning of proportionality and subsidiarity that the treaties and case law require. These instructions are not merely on the margins of legality; they are unconstitutional. They shake the integrity of the entire legal order.
More seriously still, Article 17(8) of the TEU places the Commission under the sole responsibility of the European Parliament, and not of the European Council. Ursula von der Leyen's voluntary commitment to report annually to the European Council establishes a relationship of tutelage that the treaties specifically sought to prohibit. This independence of the Commission from the States, guaranteed by its parliamentary accountability, is the sine qua non of its role as guardian of the general interest. To turn it into the executor of an intergovernmental summit is to betray the very spirit of the community method.
Do you remember what Seguin said on this subject? you should, because the bulwark against that was the vote against Maastricht, which was rejected, but which Barnier sent back to us under Sarko, full force and under another name, the Treaty of Lisbon…
Admittedly, each of these measures, taken in isolation, can deck itself out in the trappings of pragmatic adaptation to geopolitical urgency. Examined together, they effect a permanent redistribution of legislative power in flagrant violation of the institutional balance. And that is where the trap lies.
The treaties nevertheless offered a royal road for such changes: the ordinary revision procedure of Article 48 of the TEU, with a convention, an intergovernmental conference and ratification by each Member State. When, in the 1980s, the same concerns about competitiveness and urgency arose, leaders had the courage to revise the treaties. The 1986 European Single Act, the fruit of the Commission's White Paper and not of an informal summit, had introduced qualified majority voting, strengthened Parliament and set the 1992 deadline. It had proceeded by formal amendment, not by circumvention.
What separates Alden Biesen from 1986 is not ambition, but the conscious choice of the non-constitutional path even though the legitimate path remains open.
Before going further, we must say where this agenda comes from. Almost word for word, the proposed reforms come from a German-Italian working document, and yes, always Germany, I never stop ringing the alarm bells, from another emanating from six Northern States, including the three little Baltic pigs, at random, and from the Antwerp Declaration signed by more than 500 business leaders alongside the President of the Commission. So these are not Commission initiatives assessed in the general interest, but proposals coming from industry and certain States, incorporated into a summit declaration and then sanctified by a communication on "better regulation" intended to legitimise what had been infringed.
Does everyone fully understand what that means? This is extremely serious!
This is where the castle method is fully revealed: obtaining the results of new treaties without ever respecting what the treaty requires. Joint declarations, Commission communications, accountability commitments before the European Council, regulatory guidelines: all instruments of soft law that, once accumulated, produce effects equivalent to a treaty revision without its visibility, its deliberation, or its democratic safeguards.
This is the dream path to a Federal Europe, as the Krauts already wanted just 10 years after the war, when they were blocked by General de Gaulle. It was the Hallstein method. Now listen and watch what Von der Leyen is doing, who surrounds her in her inner circle, and what Merz is doing. On March 4, 2026, Merz was in the USA, thick as thieves with Trump, at the very moment Macron was sending the CDG carrier group supposedly to the Mediterranean, from where it will take the Suez Canal to bypass and come toward the Strait of Hormuz, currently closed. Yes, without telling you, without talking to anyone about it, he could have dragged France into war alongside the USA and Israel against Iran, which he holds as the sole and only party responsible for the conflict, since late February 2026.
This method is part of a broader and more insidious constitutional drift. Unlike a formal reform, always reversible, always publicly debated, constitutional drift advances in small touches, each one defensible, until the moment the institutional landscape is transformed irreversibly. We saw it during the Euro crisis, with intergovernmental agreements outside the treaties, with the normalization of emergency procedures, Covid and the series of scandals that go with it but that ultimately bother no one, which proves the Brussels lobbyists right.
Each time, geopolitical emergency served as justification; each time, citizens, national parliaments, and civil society paid the heaviest price.
Listening to Macron, UVDL, Merz, and the others, we are in a geopolitical emergency. Macron's speech at Ile Longue was not written in the Falcon he took to get there. So Iran has nothing to do with that speech. No, unfortunately in that speech, the geopolitical emergency is Ukraine and the fictitious enemy that was decided as early as 2014 would be Russia.
And besides, what is the point of that speech if it is just to say that we are going to move a few little bombs around Europe, manufacture others, that we are going to conduct joint exercises, but that no one except his majesty will be able to do anything. Honestly there is no point to that, it would be just as well for things to stay as they are today. Moreover, if one wants to be feared and strong, one need only shut up and say nothing and act. So there is a plan within the plan.
The novelty of Alden Biesen lies in its absolute contempt for the constitutional limits that nonetheless frame the action of States within the European legal order. Five structural reforms drawn directly from industry and unofficial documents, endorsed by a Commission accountability commitment before the European Council, and previously legally armored by a communication that rewrites the rules being violated: that is the contemporary face of the drift.
Yet it is precisely by this castle method that the European Union and its Commission now manage to deceive their own citizens with remarkable consistency. They repeat ad nauseam that the Union is a space perfectly framed by laws and solemn texts, that nothing can be done there outside the treaties and the procedures provided for. Colossal lie. Thanks to the castle method, it becomes possible to revise the treaties indefinitely, without parliamentary ratification, without a popular vote, without any of the democratic safeguards that citizens still believe exist. The castle allows everything, and above all the invisible.
This reality takes on a tragic dimension when applied to the decisions that directly affect France. The Mercosur treaty is its most cruel and immediate illustration. This text, like others, opens the floodgates to unfair agricultural competition from Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay: meat without equivalent health standards, GMO soy, sugar, ethanol. It literally suffocates our farmers, destroys entire sectors, condemns rural regions to economic desertification. And yet, when the first concrete effects are felt, France, officially, plays the shocked innocent, feigns surprise, protests for form's sake. As if the castle mechanism had not already made it possible to advance this text without any real formal revision of the founding treaties, without the French people ever having been able to have a binding say. Not to mention the famous safeguards that Macron had the audacity to tell us he could activate if needed, but which are useless in any case, since they are not recognized on the other side.
But the danger becomes dizzying when we turn to the nuclear deterrence file.
The announcement made by Macron concerning the extension of French nuclear deterrence to the entire European Union constitutes, in this respect, a historic rupture and a strategic madness. In disregard of all treaties in force, in disregard of the TEU, the TFEU, the non-proliferation agreements, in disregard even of the French doctrine of strict sufficiency and national sovereignty, Macron proposes to place French nuclear fire at the service of a Europe that has neither the legitimacy nor the democratic control over it. And it is again the castle method that makes this extension possible without solemn ratification. Through joint declarations, communications, informal commitments, the architecture of European defense can be continuously changed, without ever going back before national parliaments.
And yesterday, in my article, when I told you that the words had been particularly chosen to drown you and make you swallow yet another lie, Macron used a very specific word that I remind you of: “vital interests of France in Europe”, so unilaterally Macron sets the markers by extending to the entire EU and/or Europe the very notion of national vital interests. In this way, he legitimizes an extension of which we already know today that 10 countries are working with France, first and foremost Germany, but we will also find the three little Baltic pigs and Ukraine, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Poland, in what are called the “shoulder forces.”
Worse still: this same method opens the door to nightmarish scenarios for the European balance. Countries like Germany, which do not have the constitutional, historical and strategic right to possess nuclear weapons, in fact CBRN weapons, and which must under no circumstances become the leading military power of the continent again, could, without formal ratification of a treaty change, find themselves associated with nuclear deterrence or even become a party to it. Can we imagine for a moment Germany, through the play of these accumulated informal instructions, gaining de facto access to a shared nuclear umbrella? History screams at this prospect. The treaties of 1945, the Paris agreements, arms control, all of this could be circumvented by the castle method without any European citizen ever having had a say.
Three days after the successful test of the M51.3 strategic missile, Macron will welcome his German counterpart Frank-Walter Steinmeier in Bordeaux. Together, they will visit the ArianeGroup facilities where the M51 booster is produced, as well as the CEA/DAM Laser Mégajoule (LMJ). This equipment is a key element of the French simulation program, which makes it possible to design new nuclear warheads, such as the new TNO-2 equipping the M51.3, without ever conducting real tests.
This visit unfortunately marks a new stage in the implementation of the “advanced deterrence” initiative launched last March, by strengthening the “strategic intimacy” between the two countries.
So, to go further, here is how it should be done for the plan to work, using the “castle” theory, knowing that as of October 7, 2026, no one in the French political class reacts or sees beyond the end of their seat as a deputy, senator, or their mandate… Of course not, they are far too busy, especially fomenting the future war against Russia...
The objective is clear: to transform the “advanced deterrence” announced on March 2, 2026 at Île Longue (declaratory extension to European interests + participation in exercises, without sharing decision-making) into a de facto European nuclear umbrella, within the framework of a creeping federalization of the EU already underway. All of this through the castle method: informal declarations, Commission communications, voluntary commitments, omnibus packages and annual reports that pile up until they create a new institutional reality, without treaty revision, without ratification, without public debate.
1. Phase 1 – The next “castle” (spring-summer 2026): setting the stage without saying anything explicit
Macron: I organize or let a new informal summit of heads of state and government be organized, this time on the theme “European strategic autonomy in the face of hybrid threats and transatlantic uncertainty”. No binding final communiqué, just a “joint declaration of intent”. I slip in that “French advanced deterrence now constitutes a central element of European collective security”. Merz supports me publicly: “Germany is ready to assume its share of conventional responsibility to make European nuclear protection credible.” No one talks about a “EU umbrella”, they talk about “reinforced shoulder-to-shoulder support” and “shared vital interests”. That is almost exactly what was said on March 2, by the way.
Von der Leyen: I prepare in advance a Commission communication entitled “Towards a simplified and resilient European defence”. Incidentally, this is also Macron's dream. Under the guise of “better regulation” and “reducing administrative costs in defence”, I propose to institutionalize annual consultations on strategic planning, including French nuclear exercises. I commit to reporting annually to the European Council on “progress in integrating deterrence capabilities into the common defence posture”. Exactly as at Alden Biesen for competitiveness: we circumvent Article 48 TEU without touching it.
Merz : I discreetly validate. Germany does not want the bomb, but wants to be “under the tent”. He already said this this year at the Munich conference. I push for the declaration to mention “the German contribution to the credibility of the arrangement” (logistics, bases, indirect financing via the EU budget). This protects me politically at home while locking in dependence on France.
2. Phase 2 – Silent accumulation (2026-2028): turning words into habits
We launch a series of omnibus legislative packages “Defence 2030”. Each package contains:
· Sunset clauses for former NATO-centric formats;
· A preference for European regulations over national directives;
· The gradual integration of French nuclear exercises into the “European defence semester” (which I already launched, Ursula);
· EU budget funding for “the adaptation of command and communication infrastructures” (implicitly: liaison with French SSBNs and air bases).
Macron: I repeat at every speech: “The ultimate decision remains French, sovereign, untouchable.” But I let the Commission and the European Council talk more and more about “European nuclear insurance” and “vital interests of the Union”. The Île Longue discourse evolves on its own, from “French advanced deterrence” we naturally move to “European deterrence assured by France”.
Von der Leyen: I am creating an “annual defense simplification report” presented to the European Council. Every year, I tick the boxes: “Expanded participation in exercises”, “Joint planning of crisis scenarios”, “Integration of French capabilities into the EU’s overall posture”. After three reports, it has become the norm. No one can turn back without breaking the entire arrangement.
Merz: I push through the Bundestag a resolution “supporting the French advanced deterrence initiative as a pillar of European security”. Germany discreetly finances (via the European Defence Fund) conventional cruise missiles that “back up” French nuclear forces. We call it “complementarity” rather than sharing. The only dark spot for Merz: the CDU has just been swept away in the elections, so the AfD will have to be contained at all costs, even if it means banning the party.
3. Phase 3 – Creeping federalization (2028 and beyond): locking in the irreversible
Once the EU has moved toward more qualified majority voting on defense (via other “simplification” packages to get rid of holdouts like Orban, Fico and Babis), an informal summit bis is organized. The joint declaration will simply say: “French advanced deterrence is recognized as a constitutive element of the Union’s defense.” No need for a treaty anymore: habits are set, budgets are earmarked, exercises are joint, emergency plans are integrated.
Macron: I remain the sole master of the nuclear trigger. But the entire EU is now protected, dependent, and politically aligned. France becomes the pivotal power again without having conceded anything on paper.
Von der Leyen: I have succeeded in federalizing defense through the back door. The European Parliament and citizens see only “more cooperation”, “more security”, never a treaty revision, always with the Russian threat as a backdrop, hybrid attacks, real or not, that is not the point, but an enemy is needed, and it is Russia.
Merz: Germany is protected without having violated its history or its domestic law. Berlin pays, Paris decides, Brussels coordinates. A perfect balance for us, at least on paper.
Why does no one suspect a thing?
Everything is presented as a “pragmatic adaptation to geopolitical urgency” (Russia, Trump, China, Taiwan and the Middle East).
No major debate: only “informal” summits, technical communications, annual reports.
The language shifts imperceptibly: “French advanced deterrence” → “European dimension of deterrence” → “European deterrence”.
The NPT remains formally respected (no transfer of control), but the umbrella covers 450 million Europeans.
When a national parliament or a journalist raises concerns, the answer is: “It is only a political declaration, nothing has changed in the treaties.”
That is the beauty of the castle method: the treaties are rewritten without ever reopening them. In five years, the entire EU will be under the French umbrella, and no one will be able to say exactly when it happened. Mission accomplished.
Now let us go further and imagine that no one has seen anything, since in parallel the conflict in Ukraine continues under the impetus of the 5 horsemen of the apocalypse, the West continues to cast Russia as the enemy of democracy and of the EU, and the French political class is content with speeches, stupidly nodding its head and saying it is reassured, as on March 3, 2026, saying everything is fine, the nuclear button stays with us. I am not talking here about the opening of another war front in the Middle East, which could come and precipitate things. On the other hand, one must be fully aware of the whole situation, including that of Ukraine, whose integration the EU seems to want to force through. There is no smoke without fire… Besides, if the Commission is seeking to bring in Ukrainian commissioners, even though Ukraine is not part of the EU, it is not for nothing, it is because Von der Leyen is already thinking about it…
Ultimate strategy: How Von der Leyen and Merz snatch the nuclear button from France at the heart of the Federation of the United States of Europe. Walter Hallstein’s dream realized through the castle method
We are in the aftermath of phase 3 (around 2029-2030). Macron or his successor and the French political class still believe they hold the codes. They are mistaken. The French umbrella has already become European in fact; all that remains is to turn it into a federal weapon whose key France will no longer hold. The goal: to move from "French forward deterrence" to "European deterrence" and then to "federal deterrence," held and triggered by the President of the Federation of the United States of Europe.
Exactly as Walter Hallstein had dreamed in 1954: a supranational Federal Europe, with a strong Commission, a powerful Parliament and a single executive capable of exercising collective sovereignty, including in the supreme regalian domain.
Here is how we proceed, step by step, always by the castle method: never a formal revision of the treaties, never a ratification, never a public debate that alerts Paris and above all not the French. Only informal declarations, Commission communications, annual "simplification" reports, omnibus packages and "competitiveness and security" summits that pile up until they create an irreversible reality.
Phase 4 (2030-2032, or even earlier, this could be done as early as 2028 or 2029): The silent proclamation of the Federation
We organize a new informal summit at the castle (or at Laeken, whatever the setting). Theme: "Completion of political union in the face of existential threats." The joint declaration, prepared by the Commission, soberly affirms that "the Union, having become an indissoluble community of destiny, crosses the threshold of a federation of states and citizens." This is already what Macron said on March 2, 2026, as well as other key political figures for several months, even years, especially since 2014 and 2022. And yes, once again Ukraine, which fits perfectly into this catastrophic scenario.
Not a word about revising Article 48 TEU. Ursula Von Der Leyen immediately presents a communication "Towards simplified governance of federal defence" that institutionalizes a "European Federal Security Council" (the new name of the enlarged European Council) and a "President of the Federation" appointed for five years by an enlarged qualified majority of the institutions (Parliament + Commission + Council). It is not excluded that instead of UVDL it could be Macron himself, but let us assume, for the sake of example, that it remains UVDL, a German to boot.
Merz or his well-chosen successor speaks publicly: "Germany is ready to fully assume its share of shared sovereignty, including in strategic matters." Macron or his successor protests feebly; we reply that "nothing has changed on paper" and that it is merely a "pragmatic adaptation." In three annual simplification reports, the title "President of the Federation" becomes the norm. The European Parliament passes a resolution hailing "the completion of the Hallsteinian project." No one saw anything coming.
Phase 5 (2032-2035): The euro-federalization of nuclear command
We launch the omnibus package "Federal Defence 2035." Under the guise of "simplifying procedures and reducing duplication," it integrates:
- French nuclear forces into the "Unified European Strategic Command" (created by regulation, not by treaty);
- Operational planning and exercises become co-decided by the President of the Federation and the European chief of staff (appointed by the Commission), remember in 2024 the creation of the post of Defence Commissioner of Kubilius, which is not provided for anywhere in the texts governing the EU, nor in any founding treaty, no treaty at all, that made me jump, and I must have been the only one, yet the trap was already quite big and visible;
- Automatic sunset clauses for the former "national" formats (the French doctrine of strict sufficiency gradually disappears from official documents).
The language slips imperceptibly into all the Commission's annual reports: “French forward deterrence” → “European deterrence assured by France” → “federal deterrence of the Union”. Merz makes every German budgetary contribution (and Germany funds 30% of the European Defence Fund) conditional on “equal and supranational governance”. Ursula has a “Federal Security Charter” passed by the European Parliament under an accelerated procedure: it stipulates that “in the event of an existential threat to the Union, the decision to engage falls to the federal executive”.
Macron or his successor still protests? We counter that “the ultimate decision remains technically French, but henceforth falls within the federal general interest”. The physical codes remain in Paris, but the launch protocols go through the federal command centre in Brussels. In a crisis, the Federal President presses the political button; France is left with only the role of technical executor.
Phase 6 (2035 and beyond): Irreversible lock-in – The button is no longer French
Once the Federation is proclaimed and the institutions are in place, we organise one final informal summit. The closing declaration is crystal clear: “The Union's nuclear deterrence is a federal common good whose use falls exclusively to the President of the Federation, on the binding advice of the Federal Security Council by qualified majority”. Earlier in this article I told you that the qualified majority could be a rampart or a guillotine. It is a guillotine...
No need for a treaty any more: habits have been formed over ten years, budgets are earmarked, emergency plans are integrated, joint exercises have been held for years.
Why can France no longer do anything?
- The enlarged qualified majority (obtained through successive simplification packages) makes it possible to override the French veto. Remember that even today, Von der Leyen is doing everything she can to abolish member states' right of veto.
- Germany, the largest net contributor, demands “strategic parity” in exchange for its money. Inevitably, France is already ruined in 2026, and Germany plays for it, while France shoots itself in the foot. There has never been a Franco-German couple and there never will be.
- The Commission, having become a de facto federal government (as Hallstein had wanted), controls appointments and procedures.
- Everything is presented as “the democratic and peaceful culmination of the European project”: who would dare oppose Hallstein today? There is no more de Gaulle... There are only traitors...
Macron (or his successor) wakes up one morning with a Federal President, probably German or from the North, who holds the political power to launch the French weapon. The submarines remain in Brest, the Strategic Air Forces where they are, and as for the land-based component, if it is reintroduced, see my article from yesterday, as well, but the finger on the button is no longer at the Élysée. It is in Brussels, in the office of the President of the Federation of the United States of Europe, or whatever name this federation will take.
It is the perfection of the castle method: we never reopened the treaties, we never sought ratification by the French people, we never clearly said what we were doing. We simply accumulated declarations, communications, reports, packages, voluntary commitments... until French nuclear sovereignty became federal sovereignty.
And when France finally understands, it will be too late: the Federation will exist, the button will have changed hands, and history will record that France itself opened the door to Walter Hallstein's dream through the traitor Macron.
They have won. France has lost the fire. Federal Europe has taken it back. And no one will ever be able to say exactly when it happened.
Consequences: if French nuclear deterrence is not part of NATO, if this scenario comes to pass, and even if NATO disappears, the Federation of Europe with its brand-new nuclear deterrent will replace NATO, and if Ukraine is integrated into the EU and whatever it becomes, we will have nuclear weapons less than 5 minutes' flight time from Moscow, Kaliningrad, and Minsk. Exactly what Russia does not want and exactly the reasons why it is written in black and white in the Ukrainian constitution and in the documents governing its independence in 1994, that this country cannot be a military nuclear power, and that it cannot be part of any military alliance, that it must remain a neutral country. NATO enlargement and American nuclear weapons in Ukraine were a casus belli. In this scenario we come back to exactly the same point but worse, Ukraine will say it is not part of a military alliance but of the EU which has become the Federation of Europe. It will indeed be difficult to oppose that.
The trap is enormous, the consequences will be deadly, because this will never be settled through diplomacy, Ukraine does not want that, and if it is already doing nothing in that direction today, under the impulse of the 5 horsemen of the apocalypse, when the scenario is realized, it will be protected, as it already wishes to be today, and blood will flow dragging all of Europe with it. If it has not already happened before then.
Zelensky will not survive, he is already dead, politically and soon physically, and it is more than likely that Zaluzhnyi will replace him, he, a good little dog of British MI6, who, as if by chance, is thinking of returning to the bosom of the EU.
You I don't know, but for me it's never!
That is why we cannot, under any pretext, let Macron continue down this path. His speech at Île Longue, delivered before the French submarine forces, is not a simple foreign policy declaration, it is a national catastrophe, and the acceptance firing of the M51.3 missile from the SSBN Le Vigilant, the real message to be heard. Macron turned this firing, which perfectly bears its name, acceptance, validating the IPER period of the SSBN Le Vigilant, into a diverted political message, intended for Russia.
He betrays France's vital interests by diluting its sovereign, unique and independent deterrence into an ungovernable European whole dominated by logics that are not ours. He opens wide the door to those institutional drifts that, tomorrow, will allow Germany to circumvent its own constitutional prohibitions and to become again, through the ruse of the castle, the hegemonic military power it no longer has the right to be. Note in passing that Merz clearly said in Munich that he wanted the German army to become the leading army of Europe. All he needs now is the moustache and the NSDAP and it starts again as in '33 with the Nuremberg laws, and we all know the rest. Macron sacrifices French security on the altar of a Federal Europe that exists only in Brussels dreams and Berlin calculations.
The castle method is not a legal technicality among others. It is the beating heart of a drift that transforms the Union into a post-democratic construction where citizens are held to be a negligible quantity. Each omnibus package adopted without real consultation, each sunset clause imposed, each annual simplification report that transfers power to the European Council, each communication that legitimizes what was forbidden yesterday, all of this nibbles away a little more at national sovereignty and popular legitimacy.
Examples abound. We saw the European Council arrogate to itself during the Euro crisis a de facto legislative role that no treaty conferred on it. We saw intergovernmental agreements outside the European framework proliferate to circumvent voting rules. We saw emergency procedures become the norm. Each time the argument was the same: emergency. Each time the constitutional cost was borne by those who have no say in the matter: citizens, national parliaments, associations, the procedural rights that should allow them to participate in the drafting of the rules that govern them.
Today, with Alden Biesen, the method reaches an unprecedented degree of sophistication. Five simultaneous reforms, directly inspired by industry and by certain member states, endorsed by an unprecedented commitment of responsibility by the Commission before the European Council, and pre-armored by a communication, "better law-making," that rewrites the rules to legalize what was illegal.
The château has found its perfect formula. It allows one to revise without revising, to govern without governing, and above all to betray without ever having to give any real account.
Faced with this, France can no longer be content with token protests. The Mercosur treaty is not an accident, nor are the decisions taken during Covid. It is the logical consequence of a system that prioritises transnational industrial interests to the detriment of national agricultures. The extension of nuclear deterrence is not a generous idea; it is the symptom of a personal ambition that sacrifices French strategic sovereignty on the altar of a Europe where Germany, tomorrow, could gain through the back door what it no longer has the right to have through the front.
We cannot let Macron do as he pleases because what he wants is precisely to use the château method to push through, without ratification, changes that durably alter the balance of power in Europe. His speech at Île Longue is not a simple address; it is the act by which France renounces, in part, what has made its greatness and its security since 1960: a national, independent, non-negotiable deterrence.
The constitutional drift thus described is not reversible by ordinary means. Once habits are formed, once precedents have accumulated, once citizens are accustomed to the idea that treaties are flexible texts and not sacred texts, it becomes almost impossible to turn back. That is the strength and the curse of the château method: it advances silently, it does not spark great public debate, it does not trigger a referendum, and when at last one notices the change, it is too late.
The European Union, by claiming that everything is governed by laws and texts, lies to its citizens. It hides from them that, through the château method, it can rewrite everything. It hides from them that the Mercosur treaty can kill French agriculture without a popular vote ever having validated that choice. It hides from them that French nuclear deterrence can be diluted, shared, extended without ratification, and that Germany can, by this means, circumvent the historic prohibition weighing upon it.
It is time that the French, that Europeans, became aware of this reality. The castle method is not a legal curiosity; it is the silent weapon that allows a Brussels oligarchy and certain capitals to govern without the people. It is the reason why we can no longer tolerate Macron, in contempt of our vital interests, pushing France down this path. His speech at Île Longue will go down in History as the moment when France failed in its vocation as a sovereign power. There is still time to say no. There is still time to defend what remains of our strategic independence, of our agriculture, of our democracy. For if the château continues to dictate its law, tomorrow nothing will remain of the treaties that we believed intangible, and nothing will remain of the France that we believed eternal.
I repeat it and will repeat it again and again, it is of vital and absolute urgency that France leave the EU, NATO, the Eurozone, Schengen, and that it concern itself only with its vital national interests, with its citizens. Macron and the greater part of the political class must be neutralised as quickly as possible.