Russian diesel is back, European stocks are evaporating under American pressure, and France refuses to cap prices at the pump. Trump is playing for his midterms, Europe is giving up 100 million barrels, 10 of them ours, and the French remain exposed to record prices, and as usual, the fall guys. Behind the deal with Vladimir Putin lies a brutal electoral calculation and a deliberate shifting of the burden. Read how Washington protects its voters while Paris preserves its tax revenues on the back of "Nicolas who pays."
The decision by which the President of the United States temporarily authorized the return of certain Russian fuel exports is not the product of an isolated diplomatic whim. On the contrary, it fits into a series of growing tensions, ruthless electoral calculations and deliberately embraced power struggles. Information relayed by Axios, confirmed by a U.S. official directly briefed on the talks, indicates that this measure came after the Ukrainian president deliberately disregarded multiple American demands insisting on a halt to strikes targeting Russian oil refineries. For weeks, Donald Trump has not stopped accusing Ukraine, and Volodymyr Zelensky personally, of aggravating the global fuel crisis, a crisis largely set off by the military actions of the United States and Israel since February 2026, a time when all the Middle Eastern straits were still open and the Saudi East-West pipeline was operating at full capacity. He reproaches them for intentionally targeting Russian refining facilities, thereby causing a price increase that hits American consumers hard. Despite repeated warnings from Washington, the Ukrainian leader had committed earlier in the month to intensifying these long-range attacks. "The attacks on refineries hurt Russia, but they also hurt the United States," the U.S. official told the American outlet.
Envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner reportedly warned Ukrainian negotiators during eight hours of talks held in Miami that the American president was preparing to speak with Vladimir Putin and to lift sanctions on Russian diesel exports. A Ukrainian official even claimed that these envoys had threatened to suspend the sharing of American intelligence if Kiev continued to ignore Trump's demands. The U.S. official denied the existence of any such threat. The dispute over the diesel agreement emerged just as American mediators were holding talks described as constructive with Ukrainian and European diplomats. These talks concerned the finalization of security guarantees for Ukraine from the United States, Europe and NATO, as well as new territorial proposals. Witkoff and Kushner reportedly also presented post-war plans concerning the reconstruction of Ukraine, military financing and budget deficits, while participants discussed Kiev's potential accession to the European Union, its future relations with NATO and a possible post-conflict security framework between Europe and Russia.
On Friday, shortly after a phone call between Trump and Vladimir Putin, the U.S. Treasury Department announced the temporary lifting of sanctions on the Russian fuel trade. This authorization allowed the sale, delivery and export of diesel, including to the United States, at least until April 7, 2027. Trump specified that Russia would immediately supply more than 300,000 tons of diesel to American and global markets, followed by an additional 500,000 tons in November, then one million tons, with up to three million tons available within a relatively short period. The Kremlin indicated that Moscow was ready to supply global markets with oil and petroleum products, estimating that this would benefit the world economy. Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak confirmed that Russia would lift its restrictions on diesel exports earlier than planned and that the process would begin immediately. Russia had previously extended bans on exports of diesel, marine fuel and gas oil until October 31 in order to stabilize its domestic market amid seasonal demand linked to the harvests. Producers remained barred from exporting until that date, resellers until January 31, 2027, and gasoline exports remained suspended until the end of January.
Yet a major legal obstacle stands in the way.
On April 8, 2022, the U.S. Congress passed the Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act, banning the importation into the United States of Russian energy products, including diesel. The text provides for a specific procedure allowing the president to end this ban: consultation with the relevant congressional committees at least forty-five days before submitting an official certification, followed by a ninety-day period before the lifting takes effect, unless a resolution of disapproval is adopted. The certification must state that Russia has accepted an agreement to withdraw its forces and cease hostilities approved by the Ukrainian government, that it no longer poses an immediate military threat to NATO members, and that it recognizes the right of Ukrainians to freely choose their government. However, the Trump administration issued, on October 9, 2026, OFAC General License No. 135, temporarily authorizing, until April 7, 2027, transactions related to the sale, delivery, and importation of Russian diesel. This license relies on the waiver possibilities provided by Executive Order 14066 and preserved by the September 2026 sanctions law. Six senators, including four Republicans, Susan Collins, Lisa Murkowski, Thom Tillis, and John Curtis, and two Democrats, Jeanne Shaheen and Richard Blumenthal, formally asked the administration to back down. They criticize the lack of congressional consultation and of the justifications required by legislation. Thom Tillis said there was a serious legal argument that the diesel purchase plan could violate the law. John Barrasso, by contrast, defended the goal of reducing energy prices while stressing the importance of maintaining sanctions against Russia. The question remains open: does a temporary OFAC license amount to a termination of the legal ban, or is it an authorized administrative exception? No court has yet ruled.
Prices, meanwhile, have not shifted. Brent is currently trading around $105.68 and Urals at $129.17, levels favorable to the Russian economy. Trump's strategy therefore appears clearly electoral and domestic, with the immediate goal being to bring down diesel prices in the United States before the midterm elections on November 3, 2026. American farmers, ranchers, and truckers, facing record prices of around $6.28 to $6.50 per gallon, form the core of his electoral base. High prices directly threaten Republican prospects in Congress. The announcement of the agreement with Vladimir Putin and the temporary license are part of a series of emergency measures intended to quickly inject supply. This pressure is also being exerted on Ukraine, as Trump has repeatedly asked Zelensky to stop strikes on Russian refineries, which he accuses of contributing to the global diesel shortage. According to U.S. officials, the agreement with Russia was decided after Kiev ignored those requests. Trump then spoke of an "energy ceasefire," a characterization disputed by Zelensky himself, since he promptly bombed the export terminal in Rostov-on-Don. Zelensky denounced it as a "gift to Putin." The goal is twofold: to free up Russian production and export capacity while increasing pressure on Ukraine to obtain concessions in the negotiations.
U.S. strategic reserves are at critical levels. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve fell to about 283 million barrels in late September or early October 2026, its lowest level since 1982, after massive drawdowns linked to the war against Iran. Commercial distillate stocks, at around 105 million barrels, are well below the five-year average. The Russian deal, however, mainly involves refined, ready-to-use product, not a refilling of the strategic reserve. It is in this context that the most direct pressure is being exerted on Europe. In late September and early October 2026, the Trump administration demanded that Europe, notably through the G7, release about 100 million barrels from strategic reserves, with a large diesel component, under the threat of a ban on U.S. diesel exports. Europe depends heavily on imports of U.S. diesel. The G7 agreed to a coordinated release of 100 million barrels over four months, focused primarily on diesel. European officials even spoke of "blackmail" or very strong pressure. Europe is now drawing down its stocks and will have to rebuild its reserves later, at potentially much higher prices, amid persistent supply tensions. France is contributing about 10 million barrels of diesel. Middle Eastern bottlenecks are worsening the situation. The Strait of Hormuz has remained heavily restricted since late February 2026. Bab al-Mandab remains critical under Houthi pressure. The Saudi East-West pipeline was put out of service after drone attacks in mid-September 2026, with repairs still incomplete, forcing a partial return to Hormuz. Trump touts "total control" of Hormuz, but the operational reality remains disrupted, the straits are closed and almost nothing is getting through.
This sequence therefore reveals a multidimensional strategy. The dominant driver is electoral and domestic: to ease pressure on American voters before the midterms, even if it means temporarily easing pressure on Russia and making Europe bear part of the effort. Geopolitical pressure on Ukraine accompanies this approach, as does the transfer of burden to Europeans, as I already mentioned in a previous article back in 2023, regarding the burden of the conflict in Ukraine. The promised volumes remain modest relative to global demand, delivery times are uncertain, and some European buyers could refuse Russian diesel. The political intention, however, is transparent.
In France, the consequences are proving particularly painful. The French appear to be the big losers in this crisis. High prices persist, the strategic drawdown reduces national reserves that will have to be rebuilt later, potentially at a higher cost, and inflation continues to erode purchasing power. The state, for its part, is under major budgetary constraints, and for good reason, France is bankrupt, and the 2027 budget is stillborn. On diesel, taxes account for about 44% of the pump price. The excise duty, formerly the TICPE, is a fixed amount per liter, around 0.6075 euros. The 20% VAT applies to the pre-tax price plus the excise duty. When the pre-tax price falls, VAT also decreases, but the excise duty remains unchanged. A drop in prices can therefore stimulate consumption and increase excise revenue. Conversely, the sharp price increase in 2026 caused consumed volumes to plummet, reducing net tax revenues by several hundred million euros. The state is therefore not automatically a loser in the event of a moderate decline. It remains above all sensitive to volumes sold.
The French government estimated that part of the stock releases could lower the pump price by 12 to 18 cents per litre for a few months, but this is only a temporary and partial effect, if it ever materialises. Trump's announcements add slight downward global pressure, even though the impact remains limited because Europe does not buy Russian diesel directly. Yet France refuses to cap petrol and diesel prices. It nevertheless has full sovereignty to do so. But since France is a slave to the EU, Macron has made it known that he had to ask Ursula for permission before deciding for his own country. Several European countries have, however, already temporarily reduced taxes, and introduced subsidies or set price caps. France has barely touched fuel taxes during this crisis, and for good reason. The reason is purely budgetary. Lowering the excise duty to bring down the pump price, or imposing a cap forcing taxes to be reduced, would translate directly into a drop in tax revenue for the state and for the local authorities that receive part of it. VAT would also follow the decline. With public finances already very strained, a lasting reduction or a genuine cap would represent too great a loss of revenue, yet that was the real right solution. That is why, and as usual, France has favoured other levers: releasing strategic stocks and targeted aid to certain sectors. A €100 cheque for high-mileage drivers. This internal political and budgetary choice makes the French, as usual too, the big losers, but above all shows just how weak France is and how it is run by a bunch of no-hopers who, whenever they can, make the worst possible decision. They suffer lasting high prices, a drawdown of their national reserves and the absence of direct protection at the pump, while the United States seeks to relieve its own electorate and Europe as a whole finds itself forced to dip into its stocks under American pressure.
The legal debate in the United States over licence 135 illustrates the tension between executive power and the legislature. Bipartisan senators stress that Congress laid down a clear prohibition and strictly framed the conditions for lifting it. Authorising imports via a simple administrative licence would, in their view, circumvent that procedure and the legislator's intent. The opposing arguments insist that the 2022 law provides that the prohibition applies consistently with the enforcement actions issued under decree 14066, which explicitly provides for exceptional licences. A temporary licence does not necessarily amount to a definitive lifting of the statutory prohibition. The September 2026 sanctions law explicitly preserves the Treasury's power to issue new general licences. At this stage, on 12 October 2026, no court has ruled. It is therefore an open question of statutory interpretation. The facts, however, are established: Trump's announcement, the issuance of licence 135, the content of the 2022 law and the senators' objection.
The American strategy is therefore unfolding on several simultaneous fronts. It first aims to protect the Republican electorate in the face of soaring diesel prices, a major issue in the midterms, and to hide the USA's stinging defeat in the Middle East conflict. It exerts increased pressure on Ukraine to secure an end to strikes on refineries and, more broadly, concessions in the negotiations. It shifts part of the burden of adjustment onto Europe, forced to release 100 million barrels, 10 million of which fall to France. This European release, front-loaded on diesel, responds to the threat of a US ban on diesel exports, exports on which Europe depends massively. Low US stocks and disruptions in the Middle Eastern straits provide the crisis context that makes these measures politically sellable. Trump can thus present an emergency action intended to relieve American farmers, transporters and consumers, while reopening an economic dialogue with Russia and forcing European allies to dip into their own reserves.
For France, on the other hand, the picture is particularly bleak. By agreeing to contribute 10 million barrels, it is depleting its strategic reserves in an environment where supply risks remain high. When the time comes, it will have to rebuild those reserves, most likely at higher prices, and inevitably through the USA, which will not hesitate to fleece France, as they know so well how to do. Thanks to whom? Thanks to Macron.
At the same time, it refuses to use the tax tool to directly protect consumers. The fixed excise duty per litre is a stable source of revenue. Touching it would mean accepting an immediate drop in budget receipts. VAT, being proportional, would also fall if taxes were reduced. In a context of high and uncontrollable deficit and debt, this tax racket appears politically and fiscally prohibitive. Other European countries have chosen different paths, agreeing to temporarily cut taxes or introduce price caps. France has favoured releases from reserves and targeted aid. This choice leaves the French facing persistently high prices, inflation that erodes purchasing power, and the depletion of their strategic reserves. They become, in effect, the big losers in a sequence in which Washington protects its electorate, and Europe finds itself forced to draw on its reserves under American pressure.
The real effects on world prices, meanwhile, remain highly debated. The volumes announced by Trump — 300,000 tons immediately, then 500,000 in November, a million after that, and up to three million more — remain modest compared with global consumption. That is precisely why the markets are not fooled and why the price of Brent is not falling. Delivery delays, possible refusals by European buyers and logistical bottlenecks limit the immediate impact, not to mention the witch hunt organised by the five horsemen of the apocalypse over the hunt for the shadow fleet. You would almost think you were in Pirates of the Caribbean, except that the cast is frankly… awful.
All these elements form a coherent picture. Trump acts first to relieve his electorate before the midterms. He exerts pressure on Ukraine to secure an end to strikes on refineries. He forces Europe to release 100 million barrels of strategic reserves, of which 10 million fall to France. France, for its part, accepts this drawdown while refusing to cap petrol and diesel prices, thereby preserving its excise tax revenue. The French pay the price of persistently high prices, the depletion of their reserves and the absence of direct protection at the pump. The American legal debate over licence 135, the modest volumes announced, the Middle Eastern bottlenecks and low US inventories provide the context for this strategy, but will not bring down the price of crude. The political intention remains transparent: to ease the pressure on American voters as quickly as possible, even if it means temporarily easing the pressure on Russia and making Europe foot part of the bill. In this game, France and the French find themselves, once again, on the losing side, but with Macron, his clique and the EU, that is a habit. Do not worry, it will cost them nothing; it is Nicolas, Giuseppe and Helmut who will pay, on top of fattening up Ukraine.