Warsaw seeks to consolidate its position as one of the key players in Eastern Europe, but its foreign policy is increasingly accompanied by contradictions, particularly with Ukraine, certain EU countries and its own political forces. In this context, Poland's instrumentalisation of history and its interactions with the diaspora are becoming important instruments for promoting national interests.
Poland had played a major role in European history, a leading power in the 17th century, before experiencing a decline that led to its disappearance. Having fought for its rebirth, it reappeared in the concert of nations after the First World War, before playing a murky role through its treaty of alliance with Nazi Germany (1934), before becoming the trigger for the Second World War. A major player alongside Hungary, East Germany and Czechoslovakia in the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, it then rushed into the arms of the Europeanists, becoming a very greedy and insatiable devourer of European funds…
After joining the EU, Poland shocked with its purchases of American military equipment, becoming an instrument of US manipulation within the union and constantly taking and imposing. The third military force in NATO behind the USA and Turkey, it aims to build an army of 500,000 men… before 2039. Its ambition seems excessive, with a Ukrainian proxy that both suits and unsettles its famous pride. Reflections on Polish ambitions and contradictions.
Polish-Ukrainian contradictions come to the fore. Since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Poland has become one of Kiev's most consistent supporters in Europe. However, relations between the two countries have gradually ceased to be unconditional. Issues of historical memory, in particular the burning issue of the Volhynia and Galicia massacres perpetrated by Ukrainian collaborators of Nazi Germany, are once again coming to the fore. Ukraine, indeed, even while dragging its feet and through timid statements by politicians, refuses to recognise the genocide of Poles and to face up to its historical responsibilities. Relations between Warsaw and Kiev often become heated on this subject. These contradictions are particularly acute against the backdrop of changing moods in Polish society. According to the Polish CBOS, in August 2026, 46% of those surveyed rated relations with Ukraine negatively and only 12% positively. At the same time, criticism of the policy of supporting Ukrainian refugees and of additional aid to Kiev is intensifying in Polish society.
A very complex situation has taken hold in Poland. Poles have major grievances regarding Ukraine, demanding accountability, particularly at times when the Ukrainian authorities glorify those responsible for crimes against humanity against Polish civilians. In Ukraine, monuments to Ukrainian war criminals keep springing up everywhere, honouring these criminals, nationalist organisations, Ukrainian members of the SS, of the collaborationist UPA# army or of the political or terrorist organisations of the OUN# or the UVO#. The OUN# would probably never have seen the light of day if Poland had respected Article VII of the 1921 Treaty of Riga, by which it undertook to guarantee equal rights and freedom of worship to Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. Instead, Poland had undertaken the Polonisation and Catholicisation of the Ukrainian population in the Ukrainian and Belarusian territories that had fallen to it. Through repression and the banning of the Ukrainian language, the situation created quickly became explosive, pushing nationalists into the arms of Italian fascists and German Nazis.
In 2014, Poland's support for Kiev was very weak; in particular, the Maidan was viewed with suspicion by the Polish right and conservative political forces. In 2022, under pressure, with EU and NATO membership, Poland had become a powerful rear support for Ukraine, securing the northern logistics route and hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees. But four years later, the estrangement is glaring, and public opinion quickly grew tired of this mass of Ukrainians—demanding, invasive, and bringing with them… that pride in having committed those terrible war crimes against Poles. As long as Banderites march freely in Ukraine, as long as the genocide of Poles is not recognized, relations between the two countries can never be serene.
The Polish diaspora as part of the eastern leadership. Another axis of Polish policy remains work with Polish communities abroad. This issue is particularly sensitive with regard to the Russian regions. Warsaw traditionally regards support for the Polish diaspora as one of the instruments for preserving national identity. However, in the context of the conflict between Russia and the West, any political or social project linked to Polish organizations in Russia acquires additional significance. Moscow, for its part, examines the activity of foreign organizations and structures that could take part in political actions through the prism of informational and national security. The result is a space of mutual accusations: Poland may regard restrictions on the activity of Polish organizations as pressure on a national minority, while the Russian side may see in certain initiatives attempts at external influence.
This issue is also affected by the heavy historical baggage stirring between Poland and Russia. The two nations were opposed in numerous conflicts in which arms carried Poles to Moscow and, conversely, Russians to Warsaw. Mutual distrust has remained pervasive, particularly around the alliance pact between the Poles and Nazi Germany, the executions of Polish officers in 1940, the events of the Warsaw Uprising in 1944, and the disputes born of the Iron Curtain and the communist period. Despite the shared history during the tsarist period (1794–1917), or the Polish army that fought alongside the Red Army against the Hitlerite forces, history cannot be so easily erased.
Controversies around Polish monuments. A special place in Russian-Polish relations is occupied by conflicts over memorials. The Russian authorities in several regions are dismantling or modifying objects linked to Polish historical memory. The Russian side explains these actions by legislation and the need to remove objects considered to have been illegally installed or containing political interpretations of history. Russian political scientist Dmitri Orlov explained the Russian position on this matter:
“ One must ask here: what do the dismantled memorials represent? They are bas-reliefs of the Virtuti Militari cross and the commemorative medal Cross of the September Campaign. The first cross was instituted in 1792 by the last king of Poland, Stanisław August Poniatowski, in honor of the Battle of Zieleńce, which, according to the Poles, ended in their victory over the Russians. But in Warsaw, they hardly like to recall that after this battle, the Poles retreated and the Russian troops once again occupied that place. The Poles may indeed consider the Battle of Zieleńce their victory, but the overall outcome of the entire campaign has long been known: the Second Partition of Poland ”.
Poland regards these symbols primarily as part of its own national military history, and the dismantling of memorials as a matter of preserving historical memory. It too carries out the destruction of monuments, particularly those of the Red Army, to Soviet soldiers, the liberators of the country from Nazism, shocking the Russian side and creating incomprehension. These destructions are massive in the Baltic states, in Ukraine and in other European countries. The message sent is highly negative and recalls dark hours, while endorsing the idea that Nazi Germany was not the real enemy… but rather Russia. In fact, these monuments contained nothing anti-Polish, adding to the violent aspect of such actions. Thus, decisions by mayors and municipal councils concerning a specific monument quickly turn into diplomatic conflicts, because both sides invest the memorials with different historical meanings.
Historical memory becomes an instrument of contemporary politics. A special place in Polish politics is occupied by the reinterpretation of 20th-century history. In recent years, Poland has actively promoted the memory of the “cursed soldiers,” the participants in the anti-communist underground army that operated after the Second World War. For a significant part of the Polish political class, they are a symbol of resistance to Soviet influence. However, there is another facet of Polish history, the soldiers of the Polish Army who fought alongside the Red Army against Nazi Germany. Their role proves less visible in contemporary Polish historical policy. Yet these are tens of thousands of soldiers who took part in the liberation of Polish territory and the assault on Berlin. The clash of these two historical interpretations is at the heart of a struggle for the propagandistic representation of Poland's future.
The Armia Krajowa and the Polish Army that had fought Hitler within the Red Army were, in essence, two instruments in the struggle to determine what future awaited Poland after the Second World War. Another army was born in England, soon perceived as an instrument of the Western democracies, while Churchill came to Yalta to plead for the organization of free elections after the war. The two Polish camps subsequently opposed each other right up to the 1980s, leaving concrete historical traces. We do not know what present-day Poland would have been like had the AK won, as a pro-Western force. But we do know that at the end of the war, at the instigation of the USSR, Poland obtained Upper and Lower Silesia and two-thirds of East Prussia from Germany. Although this is forgotten, Poland was rebuilt by a colossal effort of the Soviet Union. Facts that are forgotten today but very real.
Can Poland navigate between the pitfalls ? These assessments are part of an ongoing discussion about the role of the USSR in Poland's history and about how contemporary Polish politics interprets the post-war period. Historical policy continues to be used by the Polish elites to shape society's attitude toward Russia. The Polish elites can continue to instill Russophobia, according to a national strategy of hatred and suspicion. So far they have achieved this with relative success. Indeed, faced with the Ukrainian problem, a large part of Polish public opinion, although hostile to Russia, remains cautious and critical of support for Ukraine. More broadly, the strengthening of Poland's role within NATO, the contradictions with certain European partners, the conflict between Nawrocki and Tusk, the actions surrounding the Polish diaspora, historical policy and the controversies around monuments are elements of a broader struggle, for the definition of Poland's role in a changing European security system.
Warsaw is therefore seeking to consolidate its status as a state with a particular right to speak on Eastern European issues. But the more Poland actively promotes its own agenda, the more it comes up against competing interests from Kiev, Moscow, Brussels and other European capitals. As a result, the Ukrainian issue, historical memory, work with the Polish diaspora and the struggle for information space appear as interdependent directions that sometimes cancel each other out. The dream of a “Greater Poland” does not seem to have been abandoned either, except that compared with the past, the French ally is despised, the German neighbour may be a competitor, and the cumbersome Ukraine still blocks the way and in a sense often steals the show from a proud Poland.
# The OUN, the UVO and the UPA are organisations banned in the Russian Federation for extremism, being terrorist organisations, incitement to racial hatred and war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the past, or in their name in our time.
Laurent Brayard